

TOP SECRET

26 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Staff Meeting Minutes of 26 September 1979

The Director chaired the meeting. He briefly reported on developments re Cuba and explained that during the next few days we will be heavily involved in: (1) making sure that the entire intelligence story is properly conveyed, (2) sorting out if we can monitor compliance with whatever arrangements may be made, and (3) participation in policy deliberations with particular attention to a quick assessment of Soviet reaction to various U.S. options. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] Later in the meeting Mr. Carlucci advised that he had exchanged notes with Clarke and the latter will provide some material assessing the nature of the Soviet/ Cuba threat. [redacted] 25X1

The Director remarked on his Cuba briefing to the Senator Cranston luncheon group, noting expressed concern by several senators on how the U.S. will get out of this difficult situation. The Director advised Silver he took this opportunity to hammer away at the problem of security leaks and that senators asked what the Director is doing about this (e.g., recent articles by columnists Binder and Oberdorfer). Silver responded that a letter has been prepared for the Director's signature asking help from the Attorney General. [redacted] 25X1

Hitz called attention to yesterday's NID item on Jamaica--how Prime Minister Manley is moving with significant support from Cuba. Hitz advised that this is good stuff for highlighting Cuba's effort in the Caribbean. [redacted] 25X1

Lehman advised this is no time to lose sight of difficulties faced currently by Syria's Assad, that Assad could be very helpful toward an Egyptian/Israeli settlement. Lehman highlighted Assad's confused relationship with the PLO, the Syria/Iraq split, and instability in Lebanon. He said that in this confused situation a significant move is likely to be made soon. Relatedly, the Director described his recent conversation with [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] August visit to the Middle East with Robert Strauss. 25X1

The Director said he underscored to [redacted] the need to assess the "health trend" of Middle East radical opposition to the Camp David Accord--we need to know if the radicals are growing weaker or stronger, e.g., how well they [redacted] 25X1

[REDACTED]

Hetu called attention to Richard Burt's article in today's New York Times (attached) which deals with Soviet cheating on SALT. [REDACTED]

25X1

Hitz said he has received Snodgrass' 148-page classified annex, noting that the NFIP was cut by 2 percent. He said Snodgrass praised RMS and the Director on the quality of the justification books but, per usual, he managed to get a jab in here and there. Hitz expressed particular concern for a HAC recommended transfer of [REDACTED] from the CIA to NSA re the Special Collection Service and has asked Dirks to assess the impact toward a possible priority appeal. Hitz said the annex reflects no change in Snodgrass' position of a year ago [REDACTED] Relatedly, in response to a query from the Director, Dirks said the technical assessment of a revised life cycle for [REDACTED] will be forwarded to the Director next week. The Director emphasized the importance of timing and salesmanship that will be needed to convince the Hill re [REDACTED]

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Hitz called attention to Representative Aspin's interest in CIA's recent oil study--that Aspin wants to know all the factors used in developing this study. Hitz, Clarke and Ernst, D/OER, will meet and determine how to approach a Committee public session on this issue. [REDACTED]

25X1

Silver reported Navy Yeoman Madsen has pleaded guilty to one count instead of a plea of innocence on several counts in his espionage indictment. Hitz said this poses fewer difficulties in protecting sources and methods. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

Proctor reported on a RMS discussion yesterday (following the NFIB meeting) which dealt with the Defense Supplemental and the need for an additional [REDACTED] for the NFIP. The Director asked Proctor to provide him the latest list of specific needs. [REDACTED]

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OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

NEWS SERVICE

Date. 26 Sept
 Item No. 1
 Ref. No. _____

DISTRIBUTION II

The attached is taken from this morning's
New York Times.

U.S. Report Says Soviet Attempts Deception on Its Nuclear Strength

By **RICHARD BURT**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 25 — A report by the Carter Administration on Moscow's compliance with the 1972 strategic arms accord has concluded that in recent years the Soviet Union has made several apparent attempts to deceive the United States on the size and capabilities of its nuclear arsenal.

The report says that the United States has not charged Moscow with formal violation of the 1972 agreements, which bar deliberate concealment, and that, in most cases, questions of Soviet compliance have been resolved on a satisfactory basis. But critics of the new treaty on limitation of strategic arms contend that the report demonstrates that Moscow cannot be relied on to live up to the terms of the accord.

The discussion of Soviet attempts at deception appears in a secret report prepared by the National Security Council for use by the Senate Intelligence Committee in the debate over the new arms treaty. The report, which has been obtained by The New York Times, gives a list of 11 attempts by the Soviet Union to conceal various aspects of its missile and strategic submarine programs from American surveillance.

Dummy Missile Sites Reported

Some of the Soviet efforts at deception, the report says, were under way before the negotiation of the 1972 arms accords, which, like the new treaty, prohibit "deliberate concealment measures" that could impede attempts to monitor compliance. For example, Moscow, since 1966, is said to have engaged in building dummy missile sites and dummy submarines to confuse American intelligence.

In 1970, the report says, the Russians started construction of three tunnels at naval bases "apparently for submarine berthing to provide protection against attack and to deny information on readiness status."

The report says that while the Russians "have long practiced concealment and deception in the activities of their military forces," Moscow's efforts to hide details of their strategic programs "increased substantially" in 1974, two years after the conclusion of the first arms accords. During that year, the report says, the Government detected "broad efforts" by Moscow to conceal its mobile missile program, the construction of strategic submarines and the production of land-based rockets.

Issue Raised at 1975 Meeting

The report says that American negotiators, disturbed by the Soviet activities, brought them up at a meeting in early 1975 of a American-Soviet commission on treaty compliance. Although the Ford Administration did not charge Moscow with violating the 1972 accords, the report says, American officials "proposed that the Soviet side cease these concealment activities."

Moscow, according to the report, denied any effort to evade the arms accords. While the question was still under discussion, the report says, careful analysis of intelligence data led American officials to conclude in April 1975 that Moscow had cut back on its concealment activities. As a result, the issue was dropped.

The report, which outlines several other exchanges with Moscow over treaty compliance, is said by Senate aides to have provided ammunition for both supporters and critics of the new arms treaty. Critics, noting that Soviet deception efforts appeared to have reached a peak after the 1972 accords were signed, contend that the report demonstrates Moscow's continuing willingness to evade the restrictions of arms agreements.

Since the new treaty goes much further than the 1972 agreements in imposing limits on the size and performance of missile and bomber forces, the opponents maintain that Moscow would have more opportunities to cheat.

However, supporters of the treaty maintain that the ability of the United States to detect possible Soviet cheating efforts, as documented by the report, provides proof that the new accord could be adequately monitored.

'Seven Years of Experience' Cited

This is clearly the conclusion of the report itself, which states that "the United States has had nearly seven years of experience in monitoring activities and verifying compliance with the provisions of the SALT agreement."

"During that period," it continues, "we have established and confirmed the effectiveness of a mechanism for reporting, analyzing and making policy decisions regarding compliance-related activities."

While it stresses that most questions over Soviet compliance have been resolved to the satisfaction of American officials, the report indicates that one long-standing issue concerning Moscow's activities has yet to be settled. This concerns whether Moscow has lived up to a complicated provision in the 1972 accords, which said that if the Soviet Union wished to deploy more than 740 submarine-launched missiles, it had to deactivate older, land-based rockets.

In 1976, it says, the United States discovered that the Soviet Union had deployed 791 submarine-launched missiles without fully deactivating 51 older, land-based rockets.